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1 Introduction
1.1 Review of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
Expected utility theory has been the foundation for most of our modern economic
theories on uncertainty and risk. However, it has been challenged by more and
more empirical results pointing at violations of it. For example, it has been found
that people tend to think of the outcome as a relative change rather than the ﬁnal
status, they have different risk attitudes towards gains and losses, and they tend to
overweight unlikely events but underweight highly possible events.
All these observations call for developments of alternative theories that are psy-
chologicallymore appealing and descriptivelymore valid.TheCumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT), introduced by Tversky and Kahneman [15], stands out as one of the
most well-accepted descriptive alternatives to expected utility theory. It has three
important features:
1. Instead of evaluating the ﬁnal wealth, the payoffs are framed as gains or losses
as compared to some reference point.
2. The loss looms larger than the gain, hence the value function in losses is steeper
than the value function in gains.
3. A weighting function, in which the small probabilities are underweighted and
the moderate to large probabilities are overweighted, is introduced to transform
the cumulative probability distribution.
The ﬁrst two features are reﬂected in the two-part S-shaped value function—
concave in gains and convex in losses. The prototypical example has been given in
[15] for α, β ∈ (0, 1) and λ > 1:
u(x) :=
{
xα, x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β , x < 0.
(1)
We mention that the distinction between α and β is not essential to our results.
The third feature is captured by weighting the (cumulative) probability distri-
bution by an S-shaped function, the so-called weighting function w. The original
example of [15] is given by
w(F ) :=
F γ
(F γ + (1 − F )γ)1/γ . (2)
It is possible to assign different weighting functions for gains and losses (denoted
by w+ and w−), and we will use δ to denote the parameter in losses. Our results
extend to a large class of possible weighting functions, in particular including the
aforementioned and the alternative weighting function
w(F ) := exp(−(− ln(F ))γ)
for γ ∈ (0, 1), which has been suggested by Prelec [13].
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We deﬁne the subjective utility by
U(p) :=
∫ 0
−∞
u(x)
d
dx
(w−(F (x))) dx +
∫ +∞
0
u(x)
d
dx
(w+(F (x))) dx,
where F (x) :=
∫ x
−∞ dp. This is a generalization of the original formulation in
[15]. The generalization allows for arbitrary (continuous) outcomes, and not only
for discrete values. Our formulation includes in particular the discrete case of [15].
This can be seen easily by setting p(x) :=
∑
i piδxi , where δx is a Dirac mass at x,
the probabilities pi > 0 satisfy
∑
i pi = 1, and the (discrete) outcomes are given
by the real numbers xi. The formula for U in the discrete setting then becomes
U(p) :=
0∑
i=−m
v(xi)π−i +
n∑
i=0
v(xi)π+i ,
where π+n = w+(pn), π+i = w+(pi + · · · + pn) − w+(pi+1 + · · · + pn) for
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and accordingly for the πi with m ≤ i < 0. (Here the possible
outcomes are denoted by xi and x−m < · · · < x−1 < x0 = 0 < x1 < · · · < xn.
For details see [15].)
The classical formulation of the St. Petersburg problem (as a discrete lottery)
would correspond to this special case. Nevertheless, we prefer to take a little extra
effort to use the more general continuous setting. Readers who are not familiar with
the continuous formulation may just replace all integrals by sums to arrive at the
more usual discrete case.
1.2 A remark on the monotonicity of the weighting function
The weighting function w is usually assumed to be a strictly increasing function.
This follows from the basic fact that people weigh higher probabilities stronger
than lower probabilities. However, to our knowledge it hasn’t been pointed out so
far that the oldest and most widely used form of the weighting function
w(F ) :=
F γ
(F γ + (1 − F )γ)1/γ ,
as suggest by [15], does not satisfy this condition for allγ ∈ (0, 1). In fact, numerical
computations show that the function w is partially decreasing for γ ≤ 0.278,
compare Figure 1. The problem disappears for larger values of γ. It is surprising
that it hasn’t been found earlier (to our knowledge). This can only be explained
with the analytical difﬁculties which the complicated structure of w poses.
Other weighting functions, in particular the ones deﬁned by [13] and [11] are
strictly increasing for all values of γ ∈ (0, 1). This observation seems to suggest
that for experimental studies alternative forms should be preferred over the original
form of (2). The problem, however, is not too severe, since previous studies mostly
measured values of γ ≥ 0.3, and in this parameter regime, the weighting function
w seems indeed to be strictly increasing as numerical computations suggest.
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Figure 1. The classical weighting function deﬁned in (2) and introduced by [15] is not monotone for
small values of γ. (Here: γ = 0.2)
In fact, one can prove that w is monotone for γ ≥ 0.5: consider the derivative
of ln(w(F )) with respect to F . An easy computation shows that
d
dF
(ln(w(F )) =
(γ − 1)F γ + (γ + F )γ(1 − F )γ−1
F (F γ + (1 − F )γ) ,
and hencew is monotone if and only ifHγ(F ) := (γ−1)F γ+(γ+F )γ(1−F )γ−1
is positive for all F ∈ [0, 1]. Since the ﬁrst summand can be estimated from below
by γ − 1 and the second by γ, this is the case for all γ ≥ 0.5.
On the other hand, evaluating Hγ(F ), e.g., for γ = 0.25 and F = 0.1 gives
a negative value for Hγ(F ) and hence one can prove that w is non-monotone for
γ ≤ 0.25.
In our paper we will nevertheless occasionally use the weighting function w
as given by (2), since it is the most frequently studied version, and the problems
we are concerned with are independent of the non-monotonicity for small values
of the parameter γ. Our main motivation, however, is to provide general results
covering all classes of weighting functions, hence the function w will only be a
speciﬁc example for us.
1.3 The classical St. Petersburg paradox
The St. Petersburg paradox is usually explained with the following example: the
player Paul is reluctant to pay enormous amounts of money for a gamble that Peter
offers him – he will get 2i ducats when the coin lands “heads” on the ground for
the ﬁrst time at the ith throw – which has an inﬁnitely large expected value (EV).
This example already dates back to Bernoulli [3]. The solution of this problem is
Cumulative prospect theory and the St. Petersburg paradox 669
usually to replace the formula of EV with the one of expected utility, in which a
strictly concave utility function makes the subjective utility of the large outcome
no longer high enough to compensate the very low probability associated with it.
It is, however, important to keep in mind that for gambles with inﬁnite EV, the
strict concavity of the utility function alone cannot guarantee the expected utility to
be ﬁnite. For example, if Peter offers Paul 22i ducats when the coin lands “heads”
at the i-th throw, then with a strictly concave utility function like u(x) := x0.8, the
expected utility is still inﬁnitely large. (Even in the original example, the strictly
concave utility function u(x) := x− e−x still leads to an inﬁnite expected utility.)
Such insight was ﬁrst made by Menger [12] with his illustration of the “Super-
Petersburg Paradox”. He concluded that unless the utility function is bounded, it is
impossible to discriminate all possible probability distributions. One could argue,
however, it is not necessary to discriminate all possible probability distributions,
because no individuals or organizations can offer a lottery with unlimited EV.
Actually, Arrow [2] pointed out that if we only consider distributions with ﬁnite
EV, we can still guarantee ﬁnite expected utility even though the utility function is
unbounded. More precisely he found the following result:
Proposition 1 Let p be a probability measure with ﬁnite EV E(p) < ∞ and let
u : R → R be a strictly increasing, concave utility function, then the utilityU(p) :=∫
u dp is ﬁnite.
(We remark again that this statement is a generalization of the case of discrete
outcomes where the integral is replaced by a sum. Hence the usual formulation of
the St. Petersburg problem in terms of a discrete lottery is included.)
In other words, the St. Petersburg paradox can be resolved by allowing only
for “realistic” lotteries, i.e., under the assumption of a ﬁnite EV, a (not necessarily
strictly) concave utility function is sufﬁcient to guarantee that the expected utility
is ﬁnite.
Even though this fundamental statement is mathematically easy in the frame-
work of expected utility theory, it turns out to be false in the context of CPT. In fact,
we will show in the Section 2 that in cumulative prospect theory a gamble with a
ﬁnite EV can have an inﬁnite subjective value – independent of the concavity of the
value function u.
The intuitive explanation for this phenomenon can be seen as follows: In ex-
pected utility theory, a concavity of the utility function is sufﬁcient to bound the
utility as long as the EV of the lottery is ﬁnite, because a person’s certainty equiv-
alent is less than the EV if he/she is risk averse. When the probability weighting
is nonlinear, however, the risk attitude depends on the interaction of the value and
weighting function, as well as the probability distribution [9,16]. In case of the
probability weighting function as formulated in CPT [15], the inﬁnite slope of the
weighting function at zero and unity counteracts with the concave value function –
when a lottery has a too long “tail” similar to the St. Petersburg gamble, the propor-
tional weights given to the outcomes at the tails are unboundedly high. As a result,
an individual’s subjective value for a lottery with a ﬁnite EV can be unbounded
even if his/her value function is concave. This is not a very reasonable situation
for individual decision making. To avoid this problem, we need to make sure that
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the interaction of weighting function and value function behaves like the concave
utility function in expected utility theory at the tails of probability distribution.
Generalizing this idea, we ﬁnd special cases in CPT under which the prob-
lem can be resolved. In particular we will deﬁne a class of admissible probability
distributions and admissible parameter regimes (Sect. 2.3) and we will suggest an
alternative weighting function which allows for an extension of Theorem 1 to CPT
(Sect. 2.4). Some of the results presented in Section 2 have already been found
independently by Blavatskyy in the context of discrete lotteries [4].
In the ﬁnal Section 3 we summarize our results and discuss the possible modi-
ﬁcations of CPT that resolve the paradox.
2 The St. Petersburg paradox in CPT
2.1 General result
The central result of this section is the following Theorem 1. It provides precise
conditions under which the St. Petersburg paradox in CPT occurs. We will later
derive several results from this theoremwhich are more accessible and which cover
situations of particular interest, compare Theorems 3–5.
Theorem 1 (General result) Let U be a CPT subjective utility given by
U(p) :=
∫ 0
−∞
u(x)
d
dx
(w−(F (x))) dx +
∫ +∞
0
u(x)
d
dx
(w+(F (x))) dx,
where the value function u is continuous, monotone, convex for x < 0 and concave
for x > 0. Assume that there exist constants α, β ≥ 0 such that
lim
x→+∞
u(x)
xα
= u1 ∈ (0,+∞), lim
x→−∞
|u(x)|
|x|β = u2 ∈ (0,+∞), (3)
and that the weighting functions w± are continuous, strictly increasing functions
from [0, 1] to [0, 1] such that w±(0) = 0 and w±(1) = 1. Moreover assume that
w± are continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and that there are constants δ, γ > 0
such that
lim
y→0
w′−(y)
yδ−1
= w1 ∈ (0,+∞), lim
y→1
1 − w′+(y)
(1 − y)γ−1 = w2 ∈ (0,+∞). (4)
Let p be a probability distribution with E(p) < ∞. Then U(p) is ﬁnite if α < γ
and β < δ. This condition is sharp as can be seen from Theorem 2 below.
In particular, the subjective utility may be inﬁnite for distributions with ﬁnite
EV in the setting and the parameter range of the original work by Tversky and
Kahneman [15] where α ≈ 0.88 and γ ≈ 0.65 and hence the (sharp) condition
α < γ is violated, compare Section 2.2.
We will present a proof of the general result Theorem 1 together with some
extensions in Section 2.3. Before that, we give an explicit example for a probability
distribution of outcomes which has a ﬁnite EV, but an inﬁnite subjective utility in
the setting of Tversky and Kahneman [15]. A similar example has already been
pointed out by Blavtskyy [4].
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Theorem 2 (Finite EV, but inﬁnite subjective utility) Let γ, α ∈ (0, 1), q > 2.
Let the probability density p of possible outcomes be given by
p(x) :=
{
0, x ≤ 1
Cx−q, x > 1,
where C :=
∫∞
0 x
−q dx.
Let the weighting function w+ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be given by (2) and the
value function on u : R+ → R be given by (1), i.e. value- and weighting func-
tion are chosen as in the original work by Tversky and Kahneman [15]. Let
F (x) :=
∫ x
−∞ p(x) dx be the total probability for an outcome less than x. Then we
have E(p) < +∞ and u strictly concave, but for α > γ and q sufﬁciently close to
2 the subjective utility is inﬁnite, i.e.
U(p) :=
∫
u(x)
d
dx
(w(F (x))) dx = +∞.
This result shows that it is not possible to resolve the St. Petersburg paradox in
the framework of CPT in the same way as in the utility theory: Even if we assume
strict concavity of the value function (corresponding to a risk-averse behavior) and
a ﬁnite EV for the probability distribution of outcomes (thus excluding unrealistic
situations with inﬁnite average outcome), the subjective utility can still be inﬁnite!
This paradox has already been observed independently by Blavatskyy in the context
of discrete lotteries. We refer the reader to his article [4] for details.
It should bementioned that the problem does not arise from the convex-concave
structure of the value function in CPT, since in our example we have only positive
outcomes (i.e., we work only in the concave part). It does also not arise from a
speciﬁc choice of the weighting function, since we have chosen the standard form
already introduced by [15], and could as well use an alternative form as suggested,
e.g., in [13]. This can also be seen from the general conditions under which the
problem occurs as stated in Theorem 1 above.
Let us now have a look at the proof of Theorem 2 which illustrates best the role
that the weighting function plays in the paradox.
Proof of Theorem 2. First we prove that E(p) < +∞ using that q > 2:
E(p) =
∫ ∞
1
xp(x) dx =
∫ ∞
1
x−q+1 dx =
1
2 − q < +∞.
The concavity of u onR+ is clear from the deﬁnition, so we only need to show that
the utility U(p) is inﬁnite. We compute F (x) =
∫ x
1 p(x) dx =
1
q+1 (1 − x1−q).
Denote C := 1q+1 ∈ (0, 13 ). Now we can calculate U(p):
U(p) =
∫
u(x)
d
dx
(w(F (x))) dx
=
∫ ∞
1
xα
d
dx
(
F (x)γ
(F (x)γ + (1 − F (x))γ)1/γ
)
dx
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=
∫ ∞
1
xα
d
dx
(
Cγ(1 − x1−q)γ
(Cγ(1 − x1−q)γ + (1 − C)γx(1−q)γ)1/γ
)
dx
=
∫ ∞
1
Cγ
[
γ(1 − x1−q)γ−1xα−q(q − 1)(
Cγ(1 − x1−q)γ + (1 − C)γxγ−qγ)−1/γ
+(1 − x1−q)γ (Cγ(1 − x1−q)γ + (1 − C)γxγ−qγ)− 1γ −1(
Cγ(1 − x1−q)γ−1xα−q − (1 − C)γ(1 − q)xγ+α−qγ−1) ] dx. (5)
Now we prove the following estimates for positive numbers c1, c2:
(1 − x1−q)γ−1 ≥ 1, (6)(
c1(1 − x1−q)γ + c2xγ−qγ
)−1/γ ≥ (c1 + c2)−1/γ . (7)(
c1(1 − x1−q)γ + c2xγ−qγ
)−1/γ−1 ≥ (c1 + c2)−1/γ−1. (8)
Inequality (6) simply follows from 1−x1−q ≤ 1 and γ−1 ∈ (−1, 0), whereas
(7) and (8) follow from (1−x1−q)γ ≤ 1 and xγ−qγ ≤ 1. (Here we use that x ≥ 1.)
We apply these inequalities to (5) with c1 := Cγ and c2 := (1 − C)γ to derive
U(p) ≥
∫ ∞
1
Cγγ(q − 1)(Cγ + (1 − C)γ)−1/γxα−q
+C2γ(1 − x1−q)γ(Cγ + (1 − C)γ)−1/γ−1xα−q
+Cγ(1 − C)γ(q − 1)xα+γ−qγ−1 dx. (9)
We use that for x ≥ 2 we have (1−x1−q)γ ≥ (1− 21−q)γ and since q > 2 we
even have (1−x1−q)γ ≥ (1−2−1)γ = 2−γ . Furthermore we estimate the integral
in (9) by the integral from 2 to +∞, using that the integrant is positive:
U(p) ≥
∫ ∞
2
Cγγ(q − 1)(Cγ + (1 − C)γ)−1/γxα−q
+C2γ2−γ(Cγ + (1 − C)γ)−1/γ−1xα−q
+Cγ(1 − C)γ(q − 1)xα+γ−qγ−1 dx.
Writing K = Cγ +(1−C)γ and collecting terms with the same expression in
x we arrive at
U(p) ≥
∫ ∞
2
Cγ
(
γ(q − 1)K−1/γ + Cγ2−γK−1/γ−1
)
xα−q
+(q − 1)Cγ(1 − C)γxα+γ−qγ−1 dx. (10)
We recall that a function xs is integrable on (2,+∞) if and only if s < −1, hence
the ﬁrst term in this integral is integrable if and only if α−q < −1 which is always
the case by the assumptions α < 1 and q > 2. However, the second term is only
integrable if α + γ − qγ < 0. Since we can choose q arbitrarily close to 2, this
is only the case if α < γ. In other words, if we choose q close to 2 and α > γ,
e.g. q := 3, α := 3/4, γ := 1/4, then (10) becomes +∞ and we have proved that
U(p) = +∞. unionsq
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2.2 Results on ﬁnite utility from CPT
Wehave seen in the previous section that in standardCPT the St. Petersburg paradox
cannot be resolved.However, there are speciﬁc situations inwhich the problemdoes
not occur and which can be derived from the general results of Theorem 1. In this
section we will discuss such situations.
We ﬁrst consider conditions on the probability distribution of the outcomes. The
St. Petersburg paradox can obviously not occur if we restrict ourselves to a ﬁnite
set of possible outcomes, but even a bounded set of possible outcomes sufﬁces to
prevent inﬁnite utility:
Theorem 3 (Finiteness for special distributions I) Let U be a CPT subjective
utility functional and p be a probability distribution with bounded support, i.e.
supp p := {x ∈ R; p(x) > 0} ⊂ [a, b], where a > −∞ and b < +∞. Then U(p)
is ﬁnite.
Proof. This follows from the general result, Theorem 1, but it can also be seen
directly. We assume for simplicity that w := w− = w+, use the monotonicity of u
and that w(F ) ∈ [0, 1]:
U(p) =
∫ b
a
u(x)
d
dx
w(F (x)) dx ≤ u(b)
∫ b
a
d
dx
w(F (x)) dx
= u(b)(w(F (b)) − w(F (a))) ≤ u(b) < ∞. unionsq
Many interesting probability distributions (e.g. normal Gauss distributions) do
not have a bounded support. Therefore the following extension is useful:
Theorem 4 (Finiteness for special distributions II) Let U be a CPT subjective
utility functional and p be a probability distribution with exponential decay at +∞,
i.e. there exist a, b, c > 0 such that p(x) ≤ ae−bx for all x ≥ c. Moreover, assume
that (4) holds. Then U(p) < +∞. (The corresponding condition for −∞ would
ensure that U(p) > −∞.)
Proof. This result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6. unionsq
If one wants to allow for arbitrary probability distributions, a general ﬁniteness
result can be given for bounded value functions:
Theorem 5 (Bounded value functions) Let U be a CPT subjective utility func-
tional with bounded value function |u(x)| ≤ C and let p be a probability distribu-
tion. Then U(p) is ﬁnite.
Proof. Again, this is a corollary of Theorem 1, but a direct proof, following the
ideas of the proof of Theorem 3 is also easy. unionsq
Under the restriction to ﬁnite EVs, one can also obtain ﬁniteness if the constant
of the value function is smaller than the parameter of the weighting function, i.e.
max(α, β) < γ, as we will show in Section 2.3. (In a certain sense, the value
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T
¯
able 1. Experimental values of α, β and γ, δ from various studies, compare (3) and (4) for the precise
deﬁnition of α, β, γ, δ
Study Estimate Estimate α < γ
for α,β for γ, δ β < δ
Tversky and Kahneman [15]
gains: 0.88 0.61 no
losses: 0.88 0.69 no
Camerer and Ho [6] 0.37 0.56 yes
Tversky and Fox [14] 0.88 0.69 no
Wu and Gonzalez [18]
gains: 0.52 0.71 yes
Abdellaoui [1]
gains: 0.89 0.60 no
losses: 0.92 0.70 no
Bleichrodt and Pinto [5] 0.77 0.67/0.55 no
Kilka and Weber [10] 0.76–1.00 0.30–0.51 no
function has to be “sufﬁciently concave”.) However, for the classical functions
used in [15] this condition has been violated in most studies, compare Table 1.
Nevertheless this result is important, in that it can be used to derive several
methods to ﬁx the problem:We have already seen one of them, namely considering
bounded value functions (setting asymptotically α = 0). Another approach is to
work with alternative weighting functions (setting for values of F close to 0 and 1
the constant γ = 1). We will explain this idea in Section 2.4.
2.3 Proof of the general result and extensions
In this section we give a proof of Theorem 1 and extend it to situations which are
of particular interest for the classical theory of Tversky and Kahneman [15].
Proof of Theorem 1. To keep things simple we assume that p is absolutely contin-
uous, i.e. we can represent it by a ﬁnite function p : R → R≥0. (If this is not the
case, the proof can be concluded by a simple approximation argument.)
In order to prove that U(p) is ﬁnite we need to prove that it is neither −∞ nor
+∞. For notational reasons we prove the former statement. The latter then follows
by the symmetry of the problem. Thus we assume without loss of generality that
p(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
We deﬁne a sequence {xi}, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . as follows:
First, let x0 := 0. Then deﬁne xi such that∫ xi−1
xi
p(x) dx = 2−i. (11)
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Since
∑∞
i=1 2
−i = 1, we have limi→∞ xi = −∞.
The assumption that p has a ﬁnite EV leads to the following estimate, using
(11):
∞∑
i=1
−xi−12−i =
∞∑
i=1
−xi−1
∫ xi−1
xi
p(x) dx
≤
∞∑
i=1
−
∫ xi−1
xi
xp(x) dx
= −E(p) < +∞.
Denoting yi := −xi−12−i we obtain the useful estimate
∞∑
i=1
yi < +∞. (12)
We estimate the subjective utility U(p) using (3) and (4). We denote by η all
terms that converge to zero as x → −∞.
U(p) =
∫ 0
−∞
u(x)w′(F (x))p(x) dx
=
∫ 0
−∞
−(1 + η)u2xβw1F (x)δ−1p(x) dx
=
∞∑
i=1
∫ xi−1
xi
−(1 + η)u2xβw1F (x)δ−1p(x) dx
≥
∞∑
i=1
∫ xi−1
xi
−(1 + η)u2xβi−1w1F (xi)δ−1p(x) dx
≥
∞∑
i=1
−(1 + η)u2xβi−1w1F (xi)δ−12−i.
We use the estimate
F (xi) =
∫ xi
−∞
p(x) dx =
∞∑
j=j+1
∫ xj−1
xj
p(x) dx = 2−i
to obtain:
U(p) ≥
∞∑
i=1
−(1 + η)u2 xβi−1w1 2−δi.
Using the deﬁnition of yi we derive
U(p) ≥
∞∑
i=1
(1 + η)u2 w1 y
β
i 2
i(β−δ). (13)
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By (12) we know that limi→−∞ yi = 0 and hence yβi is bounded. Using the
assumption δ > β and that limx→−∞ η = 0, it is clear that the inﬁnite sum in (13)
converges. Thus U(p) is ﬁnite. unionsq
Instead of posing conditions on the value – and the weighting functions, we
can also impose conditions on the class of admissible probability distributions and
in particular their decay at inﬁnity:
Theorem 6 Let U be an arbitrary CPT subjective utility with value function u
satisfying (3) and weighting function w satisfying (4). Let p be an (absolutely
continuous) probability distribution such that for all q < 0 there exists C > 0 such
that p(x) ≤ |x|−q for all |x| ≥ C. Then U(p) is ﬁnite.
Proof. Due to the symmetry of the problem (see above), we can assume without
loss of generality that p(x) = 0 for all x > 0. By assumption there exist δ ∈ (0, 1]
and β ∈ (0, 1) corresponding to (3) and (4). ﬁniteness of U(p). Deﬁne
q :=
δ + β
δ
+ 1 > 0.
By the assumption on p, there exists aC > 0 such that p(x) ≤ |x|−q for all |x| ≥ C.
We rewrite:
U(p) =
∫ 0
−∞
u(x)w′(F (x))p(x) dx
=
∫ −C
−∞
u(x)w′(F (x))p(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:I1
+
∫ 0
−C
u(x)w′(F (x))p(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:I2
.
The integral I2 is obvious ﬁnite, hence it is sufﬁcient to consider I1. Since p(x) ≤
|x|−q for all x ≤ −C, we have
F (x) ≤ 1
1 − q |x|
1−q.
Using the same asymptotic estimates as in the proof of Theorem 1 we obtain
I1 =
∫ −C
−∞
−(1 + η)|x|β |x|(1−q)(γ−1)|x|−q dx
=
∫ −C
−∞
−(1 + η)|x|δ+β−1−qδ dx.
Now, using the above deﬁnition for q, this simpliﬁes to
I1 =
∫ −C
−∞
−(1 + η)|x|−1−δ dx.
Since δ > 0, this is integrable, and thus U(p) is ﬁnite. unionsq
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2.4 Alternative weighting functions
Using the general results of the previous section, it is easy to suggest a new type of
weighting functions that avoids inﬁnite values for the subjective utility. By Theo-
rem 1 we only need to ﬁnd functions w−, w+ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with the following
properties:
(i) w±(0) = 0, w±(1) = 1,
(ii) w± are strictly increasing on [0, 1]. (This condition is violated for the classical
weighting function (for small values of γ) as suggested by [15], compare
Sec. 1.2.)
(iii) w± are continuously differentiable on [0, 1], i.e. w′±(0) and w′±(1) are ﬁnite.
(This condition is violated by all usual weighting functions, e.g., [15] and
[13].)
The constants δ, γ in Theorem 1 will then be δ = γ = 1 and the conditions α < γ
and β < δ will be trivially satisﬁed since α < 1, β < 1 by assumption. As a
particular example we give a polynomial function and prove the following result:
Proposition 2 Let a ∈ (0, 1), b ∈ (0, 1). Let the weighting function w : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] be given by
w(F ) :=
3 − 3b
a2 − a + 1
(
F 3 − (a + 1)F 2 + aF )+ F.
Then w satiesﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 1 for a ﬁnite subjective utility.
The function w is not arbitrarily chosen: It is actually the simplest polynomial
that satisﬁes all of the above conditions. It has the feature that the two parameters a
and b have the following easy interpretation: a is the point onwhichw changes from
overweighting to underweighting, i.e. where w(a) = a. The second parameter b
corresponds (like the parameter γ in the original model) to the curvature ofw. (One
can easily see that there exists no polynomial of degree less than three which has
a concave–convex structure. A standard ansatz with a polynomial of degree three
then leads to the above formula for w.)
A one-parametermodel can be obtained by assuming that a = 1/2. The formula
then simply reads
w(F ) = (4 − 4b)F 3 − (6 − 6b)F 2 + (3 − 2b)F.
Proof. All properties can be easily checked, since w is a polynomial. (This is a big
technical advantage compared to other weighting functions.) The ﬁniteness of the
subjective utility then follows immediately from Theorem 1. unionsq
In Figure 2 we present plots of w for different values of a and b. Of course the
deﬁnition of the weighting function w as a polynomial is just a suggestion, there
are other possibilities if one allows for more complicated functions.
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Figure 2.Alternative weighting functions w, avoiding the paradox of inﬁnite subjective utility, for some
choices of the parameters a and b
3 Conclusions
We have seen that the standard cumulative prospect theory can lead to a strange
result, namely an inﬁnite subjective utility for a probability distribution of outcomes
which has only a ﬁnite EV.To conclude,we list four possibleways to ﬁx the problem
and discuss them brieﬂy:
1. If we allow only for probability distributions with exponential decay at inﬁnity
(or even with bounded support), the problem does not occur, as we have proved
in Theorem 4 and Theorem 3. In many applications, this is the case. However, it
seems to be somehow dissatisfying to work with this restriction. In particular in
problems where we are interested in ﬁnding the optimal probability distribution
(subject to some constraints), it might well happen that we obtain a “solution”
with inﬁnite subjective utility, compare [17].
2. It is possible to assume that γ > α and δ > β, where γ, δ are the parameters
of the weighting function and α, β are the growth rates of the value functions.
By Theorem 1 this is sufﬁcient to ensure ﬁnite subjective utility. Unfortunately,
this assumptions seems to contradict many of the measured parameters in ex-
periments (compare Table 1).
3. The value function can be modiﬁed for large gains and losses such that it
is globally bounded. This again ensures a ﬁnite subjective utility (compare
Theorem 5). There are also other theoretical reasons summarized in the survey
article by Hens [8], compare also the work by De Giorgi et al. [7].
4. The ﬁnal idea is to modify the weighting function w as has been suggested
in Section 2.4. This guarantees a ﬁnite subjective utility, independently of the
choice of the value function (as long as it has a convex-concave structure). It
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is interesting to compare this approach to the weighting functions which have
been obtained experimentally by Abdellaoui et al. [1].
As a last remark we mention the problem regarding the non-monotonicity of the
classical weighting function by [15] which we had pointed out in Section 1.2. This
problem suggests strongly to use an alternative weighting function – not necessarily
the one thatwe introduce in Section 2.4, but, e.g., one of the already existing variants
listed in Section 1.2 – in further experimental and theoretical studies.
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